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The seven essays and introduction that comprise Ta-
tiana Zhurzhenko's book, address the issue of Ukrainian 
state-nation building from a very interesting angle. They 
examine, at various levels, how the emergence of inde-
pendent Ukraine affects the transformation of old, merely 
administrative Soviet borders into the “real” borders of a 
sovereign state and how, vice versa, the process of border 
making challenges, in various ways, the master project of 
nation building.
Border making, as the author rightly emphasizes, 
means not only the process of re-mapping but also of re-
narrating. Delimitation and demarcation of borders, their 
international legitimization, the development of a modern 
border infrastructure and introduction of the proper bor-
der regime—all these things are definitely important but, 
in the case of Ukraine, most of them have been solved 
relatively easily. The much greater challenge for the new 
state arises from the people's mentality. Whereas the 
western borders of Ukraine coincide with the old Soviet
borders and are firmly established not only on territory
but also in people's minds, the “new” borders - with Be-
larus, Moldova and, especially, Russia - largely lack such 
a popular legitimacy.
This is the main political-cum-intellectual problem 
that looms large in Tatiana Zhurzhenko's work. It is dis-
cussed on both macro- and micro-levels, which makes the 
book especially valuable. The macro-level is represented 
in the first part of the book, entitled “Remapping the Post-
Soviet Space,” which consists of two essays: “‘Eurasia' 
and its Uses in the Ukrainian Geopolitical Imagination” 
and “Slavic Sisters into European Neighbors: Ukrainian- 
Belarusian Relations after 1991.” The micro-level is ex-
plored in the third part of the book, “Living (with the) 
Border,” based on field research in a few border villages 
in the Kharkivska oblast of Ukraine and the neighboring 
Belgorodska oblast of the Russian Federation. It consists 
of two lengthy essays: “Making Sense of a New Border: 
Social Transformations and Shifting Identities in Five 
Near-Border Villages” and “Becoming Ukrainians in a 
‘Russian' Village: Local Identity, Language and National 
Belonging.”
The second, middle part of the book, “Bordering 
Nations, Transcending Boundaries,” gradually shifts 
the perspective from the macro-level (the chapter “Un-
der Construction: the Ukrainian-Russian Border from 
the Soviet Collapse to EU Enlargement”) to the micro-
level (“‘Slobozhanshchyna': Re-inventing a Region in 
the Ukrainian-Russian Borderlands” - on the area where 
the eventually surveyed villages are located). And, im-
portantly, this part of the book includes the pivotal essay 
on “Boundary in Mind: Discourses and Narratives of the 
Ukrainian-Russian Border” - a detailed representation of 
the author's methodology and theoretical foundations.
In fact, the methodology is briefly outlined in the 
introduction which informs us that the book “combines 
several disciplines and methodological approaches: from 
the history of ideas and theories of international relations 
to discourse analysis, political science and social anthro-
pology” [37-38], and that the book's ambitious idea is “to 
approach the post-Soviet borders as a construct produced 
by different political actors through various narratives; to 
go beyond the dominant discourses of security and inte-
gration and demonstrate their role in the process of border 
construction,” referring, inter alia, not only to the “elitist 
discourses produced by politicians and intellectuals, but 
also [to] the narratives of ordinary people living near the 
border and experiencing it in their everyday lives.” [22]
The notion of borders as not merely a physical re-
ality but also a symbolic one dwells at the heart of the 
constructivist approach applied by the author, and clearly 
justifies a critical discourse analysis as the major tool of 
the proposed study.
The fact that the border is a construct does not mean 
that it is drawn arbitrarily; it usually has some prehistory, 
e.g. a former administrative division, a historical or eth- 
no-linguistic boundary which can be used as a basis for 
delimitation. But neither these “objective” factors (usual-
ly disputed between the two sides), nor pure political will 
are sufficient for creating a border. The border has also 
to be drawn in the minds of the people. It is shaped by 
the political rhetoric of “national interests,” the dominant 
discourses of nation and state building, the discussions 
about national identity and “geopolitical choice”. Thus, 
national borders are constructed not only with border 
stones and fences, but also with words.” [155]
They are supported, to put it differently, not only by 
“hard” but also by “soft” power. They require what Claus 
Eder terms a “narrative plausibility” [19, 159].
The Ukrainian-Russian border is particularly inter-
esting in this regard - not only because it is “new” and 
physically underdeveloped, but also because it is under-
narrated, it lacks symbolical power and bears question-
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able legitimacy for the majority of Russians and the 
plurality of Ukrainians. The symbolical weakness of the 
Ukrainian-Russian border is especially noticeable in the 
near-border areas researched by Tatiana Zhurzhenko. 
Here, she notes, people “usually do not see their neigh-
bors on the other side as cultural “others”. It is rather 
economic gradients and different welfare provisions 
which constitute “us” and “them” across the Ukrainian- 
Russian border. Ukrainian identity in the borderlands 
with Russia is not exclusive and dominant, but flexible 
and situational, easily combined with Russian, “Slavic,” 
regional or post-Soviet identities” [159].
Leaving aside a debatable question whether such an 
identity could really be qualified as “Ukrainian” (i. e., 
national) rather than “Little Russian” (i. e., a merely re-
gional part of the Greater Russian, Eastern Slavonic, Or-
thodox Christian, or (post)Soviet supranational identity), 
we can in any case assume that, for a great many people, 
the Ukrainian-Russian border is rather a physical than 
symbolic reality. It does not “separate “us” from “them” 
and does not “constitute a [territorial] community whose 
members are supposed to share a common memory, 
common symbols and historical myths.” [156]
Nationwide opinion surveys reveal that a vast ma-
jority of inhabitants of eastern and southern Ukraine feel 
much greater affinity with Russians and even with heav-
ily Russified/Sovietized Belarusians than with western 
Ukrainians who had broken away from the East Slavon- 
ic/Orthodox Christian “ummah” and formed an unques-
tionably modern national identity. They are “alien” not 
only because they belong to a different - Western/Catho- 
lic/European - civilization, but also because they repre-
sent a different type of identity, one that is apparently 
incompatible with both the subnational identity of “Little 
Russians” and the supranational identity of Orthodox- 
cum-Soviet-cum-Russified Eastern Slavs. They are pre-
dictably considered “nationalistic” witin the prenational 
or supranational mental framework - even though no 
sociological data prove they are more “nationalistic” in 
whatever way than any of their neighbors to the west.
Ukraine's identity split is the major stumbling block 
in the complex construction of the new national borders. 
The two roughly equal parts of Ukrainian society have 
radically different ideas about “us” and “them” and, 
naturally, about the “common memory, symbols and 
historical myths.” They have opposite views on who is 
Ukraine's main enemy and who should be the main ally, 
and therefore which border, eastern or western, should be 
strengthened or even closed, and which should be soft-
ened or even eliminated. This means they promote op-
posing discourses and apply different ”meta-narratives” 
to Ukraine's eastern and western borders. One of these 
groups tends to present the Ukrainian-Russian border as 
a “site of hostility and of potential if not open conflict,”
while the other group considers it as a “site of contact, co-
operation and friendship, sometimes referring to old his-
torical ties and cultural commonality, sometimes stress-
ing mutual interests, common future, or both” [160].
One narrative is defined as the “narrative of secu-
rity,” the other one as the “narrative of integration.” Both 
of them, as Tatiana Zhurzhenko aptly remarks, “originat-
ed to some extent from the European Union” [162]. The 
similarity, however, is superficial. European integration 
is fundamentally different from all the projects of “Eur-
asian” integration promoted within the CIS by Russia. 
First of all, European integration is voluntary: neither 
the members of, nor candidates to the EU are forced or 
even blackmailed to “integrate.” Second, European inte-
gration is value-based: all the participants of the process 
must meet strict criteria of democracy, human rights, and 
rule of law--hardly meaningful things in Russia or else-
where in the CIS. And third, even the smallest countries 
in the EU have an equal voice and can, in most cases, 
block any decision that clearly contradicts their interests 
or undermines their sovereignty. None of the Russia-led 
“integration” projects provides this opportunity for its 
minor shareholders.
Tatiana Zhurzhenko stops short of labeling the post-
Soviet “integration” discourses a sheer smokescreen 
to hide Russian hegemonic ambitions, but nonetheless 
leaves little room for any alternative interpretation:
Borrowing the discourse of EU integration served to 
legitimize integration projects in the post-Soviet space, 
which their critics saw as a restoration of the Soviet em-
pire... This European discourse of integration at the 
Ukrainian-Russian border intertwines with the discourse 
of East Slavic unity and the common historical destiny 
of the East Slavic nations, particularly on the Russian 
side. [162-3]
The narrative of security at the Ukrainian-Russian 
border that seemingly “resonates with the EU discourse 
on the “soft threats” coming from the “new neighbour-
hood” [164] also has profoundly different meanings in 
both cases. The threats that emanate from Russia to its 
neighbors are hardly “soft.” In most cases, they include 
economic pressure, energy blackmail, trade and media 
wars, covert operations of security forces, and even di-
rect military occupation of territories - as in the case of 
Moldova and Georgia. Hence, the EU discourse on se-
curity resonates primarily with the “Ukrainian fears of 
losing national sovereignty and falling under Moscow's 
control” [164].
The fears are certainly not paranoid since a great 
majority of Russians still
consider Ukraine (with the exception of its western 
regions) an integral part of the Orthodox / East Slavic / 
Eurasian civilization. This view was developed in Rus-
sian historiography during the 19th century and became
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an indispensible part of the emerging Russian identity. 
Indeed, Ukraine was not just a “normal” colonial subject 
of the Russian empire but a constitutive element for the 
metropolitan centre... The persistence of this narrative 
in Russia during the 1990s and its popularity among both 
the elites and the population made it difficult to think 
about Ukraine in terms of a separate nation with legiti-
mate borders. While Russia officially recognized the na-
tional sovereignty of Ukraine in its present borders, the 
implicit condition of such recognition was its “geopoliti-
cal loyalty” to the former imperial core. Therefore any 
movement of the Ukrainian leadership in Western di-
rection has been met in Moscow with great suspicion. 
Ukraine with its Euro-Atlantic aspirations is seen as a 
potential traitor of “Slavic unity”. [178-79]
To put it bluntly, Russian politics in the “near 
abroad” still resembles the notorious Brezhnev doctrine 
of “limited sovereignty” applied back in the 1960-80s 
by the Soviet Union to the East European satellites, with 
tacit Western approval. (cf Putin-Denikin 188). To make 
things worse, the Russian imperial view of Ukraine is 
largely congruent with views of many Ukrainian citizens 
and has broad currency in both the local and Russian 
mass media distributed/broadcast in Ukraine. Little sur-
prise, then, that the Ukrainian-Russian border,
being closely connected to the issue of national iden-
tity, is invested with a special symbolic meaning, which 
can be understood only in the Ukrainian “post-colonial” 
context. It is the lack of clear boundaries which makes 
Ukrainian identity problematic: Ukrainian culture, lan-
guage, memory etc. first have to be separated from their 
Russian counterparts. The continuing coexistence of two 
cultures and languages in Ukraine, Ukrainian and Rus-
sian, is seen as a proof of an “unfinished nation-build-
ing,” a weakness rather than an asset. Significantly, this 
“post-colonial condition” is represented not so much by
the ethnic Russians, but by the Russian-speaking
Ukrainians. [164]
The term “coexistence” employed by the author 
tends to obscure the actual dominance of Russian lan-
guage and culture over Ukrainian in most parts of the 
country. Even though, numerically, ethnic Russians and 
Russian-speaking Ukrainians make up less than half of 
Ukraine's population, they are traditionally much more 
urbanized and therefore more advanced socially, cultur-
ally, and economically. This firmly secures them, even 
now, a strong structural dominance over the peripheral 
Ukrainian-speaking majority.
Equally misleading is the term “bilingualism” 
praised by numerous authors as a “valuable asset of the 
region” and quoted uncritically at one point (p. 220) by 
Zhurzhenko. The truth is definitely more complex. The 
region in question - Slobozhanshchyna, as well as all 
of southeastern Ukraine--represents a very dubious case
of bilingualism since only Ukrainians, mostly Ukraino- 
phones, are really bilingual there. Neither Russians nor 
Russian-speaking Ukrainians are able and/or willing, 
in most cases, to shift to Ukrainian, the language that 
is broadly considered in their milieu to be “inferior” or 
“artificial” and “alien”. Paradoxically, “nationalistic” 
western Ukraine represents a case of European, non-
Soviet bilingualism since not only Ukrainians but also 
Russians in the region are able and willing to commu-
nicate in both Russian and Ukrainian, depending on the 
circumstances.
In fact, the major dividing line in Ukraine runs not 
between east and west or between ethnic Russians and 
Ukrainians, or Russophones and Ukrainophones - even 
though there are some significant correlations between 
all these factors and two major types of the country's 
identity - Ukrainian and “Little Russian”. The main 
split is determined by the opposing notions of “us” and 
“them” and the radically different meanings of being a 
“normal Ukrainian”. In one identity discourse, Russia is 
seen as the main “Other,” and the national past is con-
sidered colonial, whereas the present is seen as an un-
finished process of decolonization. In the other identity 
discourse, the West is assigned the role of the main ”Oth- 
er,” whereas the past is considered a history of friendly 
Russian-Ukrainian cohabitation and common fighting 
the enemies - primarily Westerners, but also their aborig-
inal agents and allies - “Ukrainian nationalists” (“maze- 
pists,” “petliurites,” “banderites,” et al.). Since there was 
arguably no colonialism in the past, no decolonization is 
needed at present. The “Little Russian” group (one may 
call it “Ukrainian Creole” - as opposite to “Ukrainian ab-
original”) insists on a formal equality of both languages, 
Ukrainian and Russian, and on a laissez-faire cultural 
policy, which apparently benefits them as much stronger 
players vis-a-vis their handicapped rivals.
From the Ukrainian (“aboriginal”) point of view, 
the political emancipation from Russia is insufficient 
as long as mental/cultural/discursive emancipation is 
not brought to completion. For many Ukrainians, as 
Zhurzhenko notes, the symbolic status of the Ukrainian 
language and culture is therefore reflected, inter alia, in 
the geopolitical status of the Ukrainian-Russian border. 
And since “strengthening national identity in post-Soviet 
Ukraine requires assuming a cultural and political dis-
tance from Russia,” the new border becomes “not only 
a symbol of, but also an instrument for the creation of 
this difference” [165]. In sum, within the past 20 years, 
“the Ukrainian-Russian border has been subject to a pro-
cess of symbolic construction, which reflects problems 
of post-Soviet nation building, state efforts to national-
ize borderlands, to assimilate them as integral part of the 




So far, the results of these efforts are rather modest. 
Two crucial factors, one objective and the other subjec-
tive, put limitations on the nationalizing efforts of Ukrai-
nian authorities and on the discursive practices of Ukrai-
nian intellectuals. On the objective side, one should note 
that Ukraine is not only a heterogeneous but also rela-
tively pluralistic country where “various political actors 
and 'discursive communities' produce texts and images 
of a given territory, region, nation.” Neither the govern-
ment nor any other “actor” has a discursive monopoly 
or even clear dominance in Ukraine. “State institutions, 
local self-administration, business groups, NGOs, ethnic 
communities, political parties and organizations, media, 
academia, the education system, the all produce narra-
tives and images which‘make sense'of a border. Not only 
national states, but also international organizations [. ]
and transboundary institutions [. ] influence and create
border narratives.” In Ukraine, as elsewhere, borders are 
subject to both the “high” geopolitics made by experts 
and politicians, and “low” geopolitics made by media 
and pop culture.[158].
This means, in particular, that Ukrainian borders 
are not only “narrated and constructed by 'discursive 
communities' of various kinds,” but also intensively re-
narrated and deconstructed by some other “discursive 
communities” that include pretty resourceful Russian 
state, Russian mass media, businesses, NGOs, as well as 
their pro-Russian subsidiaries in Ukraine. They produce 
a very powerful counter-discourse (if not the de-facto 
dominant discourse in Ukraine), which Zhurzhenko 
defines as a “discourse of integration” that features the 
“common past,” “traditional friendship,” and “cultural 
affinity” between Ukrainians and Russians. The positive 
rhetoric predominates, however, only in “high” politics. 
The “low” Russian (and pro-Russian) politics is heavily 
charged with traditional ethnic stereotypes and cultural 
suprematism that overtly undermines Ukrainian identity, 
ridicules Ukrainian language, promotes xenophobic- 
cum-conspiratorial anti-Occidentalism, and deepens the 
rift in Ukrainian society between the “true,” i. e. Russo- 
phile Ukrainians and perverse “nationalists”.
On the subjective side, the nationalizing efforts of 
the Ukrainian government are restrained not only by 
powerful counter-discourses and widespread sabotage 
at various levels but also by its own inefficiency, cor-
ruptness, and institutional weakness. The main hindering 
factor, however, is the government's own reluctance to 
pursue any coherent policy of decolonization / de-Sovi- 
etization that may effectively undermine their own Sovi-
et-style, crypto-authoritarian dominance over the coun-
try. To some extent, Ukrainian rulers are deadlocked by 
two incompatible imperatives. On one hand, they need 
to promote state-nation building and strengthen people's 
national identity in order to legitimize and secure their
own rule both domestically and internationally. On the 
other hand, they cannot promote modern Ukrainian iden-
tity without purging it of various relics of Sovietness. Or, 
as Zhurzhenko aptly remarks, “in order to 'make Ukrai-
nians' one has to 'unmake Soviets'” [278]. Because, as 
she noteselsewhere, “(post)Soviet political culture and 
mentality can become an obstacle for modernization” 
[200].
But how can the post-Soviet rulers get rid of some-
thing that ensures their political dominance, restrains 
challenges from civil society and undermines real com-
petition? The essentially non-civic, paternalistic, illiberal 
and irrationally anti-Western Soviet identity is one of the 
main pillars upon which the dominance of the post-Sovi-
et elites is based. They are definitely not eager to destroy 
this pillar and expose themselves to real accountabil-
ity and political competition. Yet, they cannot but yield 
to the imperative of state-nation building and therefore 
make sporadic concessions to Ukrainian national iden-
tity.
These two factors, both objective and subjective, 
largely determine the ambivalence and incoherence of 
much of Ukrainian policies, including the policy of state- 
nation building and border making as part of it. Tatiana 
Zhurzhenko exemplifies this general ambiguity with 
Leonid Kuchma's official rhetoric of “multi-vectorism” 
that combined the “strategic goal” of European integra-
tion with a Ukrainian-Russian “special partnership”. In 
regard of the border issue, she notes, Kuchma's adminis- 
trationpaid lip service to “national security” and the ne-
cessity of “civilized borders” [the EU-styled euphemism 
for the need to strengthen the border with Russia] while 
at other occasions promoted cross-border cooperation 
and integration projects for the “border of friendship” 
[a Soviet-styled cliche applied officially to the Ukraini-
an-Russian border]. These two discourses - European 
choice and East Slavic partnership - were successfully 
combined and instrumentalized by Leonid Kuchma until 
they got into open conflict before and especially during 
the Orange revolution.[186]
The subsequent development proved, however, that 
neither the “Orange” government of Viktor Yushchenko 
nor the anti-Orange government of Viktor Yanukovych 
could completely get rid of the political ambiguity that 
seems to be deeply ingrained in Ukrainian society, its po-
litical culture, mentality, and identity. In Yushchenko's 
case, the pro-Western, Euro-Atlantic rhetoric had not 
been supported by overdue institutional reforms and 
therefore remained shallow and self-compromising. In 
Yanukovych's case, the pro-Russian rhetoric was rapidly 
cooled by Russians themselves who clearly signaled that 
they did not need any “friendship” from former vassals 
in the “near abroad,” but only full obedience.
This means there are very serious structural factors
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in Ukrainian society, as well as important determinants 
in both Russia and the EU, which create a tough frame-
work for any politician who wishes to pursue any pro-
active politics in Ukraine. Ukraine, together with Belarus 
and Moldova, belongs to a geopolitically amorphous 
zone “in between” and bears the classical characteristics 
of borderlands:
It generates hybrid models and creates political, eco-
nomic, and cultural practices which combine mutually 
excluding values and principles, while the political space 
has been torn between Western and Eastern vectors. The
persisting situation of a “final choice” to be made be-
tween West and East, between the EU and Russia - a 
“mission impossible” - produces a whole gamut of “mul-
tivector politics” on the national as well as on the re-
gional level. External pressure reproduces and strength-
ens this political ambivalence. Led by its own interests, 
the EU wants to see its Eastern neighbours as “bordered 
lands,” whereas Russia would like to preserve them as its 
own traditional “borderlands.” [36]
This “borderland” situation, Zhurzhenko concludes, 
will persist as long as the competition between ”the el-
ephant and the bear” - the reluctant empire of the Euro-
pean Union and the reluctant ex-empire of Russia - de-
termines the map of the European continent. From the 
political perspective the accomplishment of the border 
is dependent on the success of nation and state building 
in Ukraine and Russia, on the dynamics of their bilateral 
relations and on new forms of cross-border and regional 
cooperation emerging in the former Soviet space. [37]
All these “ifs,” however, can be subsumed under the 
rubric “success of nation and state building in Ukraine 
and Russia.” But the latter largely depends on the former. 
In Russia, unlike in Ukraine, the new identity is merely 
a continuation of the old supranational Soviet/imperial 
identity. Or, as Zhurzhenko astutely puts it, “the making 
of Russians does not require the unmaking of 'Soviets'. 
The new historical narrative integrates not only symbols 
of the imperial Russian past but also, selectively, Soviet 
myths and symbols” [278]. Such an identity can barely 
be defined as modern and national, and certainly does 
not support transformation of pre-modern subjects into 
modern citizens - as an important precondition of full- 
fledged modernization and successful state-nation build-
ing.
Ukraine finds itself at the bottom-line of all these ex-
pectations. Making Ukrainians as a process of unmaking 
Soviets may truly be a “mission impossible.” But this is 
the only way to pull Russia back to reality from its imag-
ined imperial world and make it follow suit. Ukraine's 
accession in the EU and NATO might be a shock for 
Russians but this is the only way to wake them up and 
force them to reconsider their obsolete and cumbersome 
imperial identity centered in the heavily mythologized
“Kievan Russia,” far beyond Russia's real history and 
geography. This might be the only way to help them to 
develop a “normal” national identity and a normal, i.e. 
reasonable and rational mode of political behavior.
Tatiana Zhurzhenko does not state this plainly. I be-
lieve, however, this a justifiable conclusion regarding the 
possible future of the ambiguous borderland that we can 
make from her well-researched and illuminating book.
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